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This article is a further contribution to 
the discourse on the ethnic ‘diffusion’ in 
European countries — the debate started on 
the pages of the Baltic Region journal by the 
triumvirate of three authors — Yu. N. Glad-
ky, I. Yu. Gladky, and K. Yu. Eidemiller [4]. 
We assume that Europe has been a major 
centre of attraction for immigrants in recent 
decades and a site for the rapid emergence 
of ethnic communities. Unlike Muslim im-
migration — a product of the Arab Spring 
and often a measure of the last resort, — the 
Chinese immigration is a result of a certain 
convergence between the ideologies of the 
host countries, committed to multicultural-
ism, and the country of origin, pursuing a 
‘go global’ policy. We chose the EU coun-
tries as a ‘demonstration site’ and the Chi-
nese diaspora as the object of research. Our 
aim is to describe the process of migration 
from China and the formation of a Chinese 
diaspora in European countries. We analyse 
the timeline and scope of Chinese immigra-
tion, the qualitative changes in the composi-
tion of the immigrants, factors affecting the 
choice of the country of entry, and the quan-
titative parameters and settlement patterns 
of today’s Chinese diaspora in the region. 
We suggest grouping the Baltic region 
states by the numbers and ‘age’ of their 
Chinese diasporas. We consider the ethnic 
‘diffusion’ as part of the ‘European project’ 
within Beijing’s global strategy. 
 
Keywords: ethnic ‘diffusion’, ‘new’ mi-
grants, Chinese diaspora, EU countries 
 
European countries in the global mi-
gration mosaic. An integral part of the 
globalisation process, the international 
migration became an easily observable 
phenomenon at the end of the 20th cen-
tury. As of 2015, according to the UN 
data, there were over 245 million people 
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living outside their country of origin,1 which is approximately 3 % of the 
population of the Earth [25]. Obviously, the influence of the ‘migrant na-
tion’ on the political, social, demographic, and economic development of 
individual countries, as well as on the intergovernmental collaborations 
and integration processes, is growing. The increase in irregular migration 
and the formation of ethnic communities often aggravates a wide range of 
problems. These include the ‘erosion’ of the pillars of national cultures, 
the replacement of the native population by migrants, the growing xeno-
phobia, the overloading of the labour market and the social security sys-
tem, brain drain, security threats (including those of terrorist attacks), the 
increased crime and corruption rates, etc. Recently, this problem has mer-
ited the close attention of international organisations, the governmental 
circles from different countries, the academic communities, and the gen-
eral public [2; 5; 11; 13; 24]. 
One of the largest migration systems in the world, Europe is being 
tested in the crucible of mass immigration [10]. In 2015, the number of 
new arrivals was estimated at 1.5 million in the EU alone. In 2016, the 
estimate was at 1.8 million people (fig. 1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Changes in the number of immigrants in the EU, 2011—2017 
 
Prepared based on [20]. 
 
With the looming economic downturn and ethnic tensions, many 
countries of the region imposed strict control over immigration and retar-
geted their migration policies at receiving the qualified specialists at the 
expense of all the other categories of migrants, including refugees. Du-
ring his time in office, Nicolas Sarkozy stressed the need to move from 
                                                     
1 This estimate does not take into account undocumented or irregular migrants. 
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‘suffered’ to ‘chosen’ immigration [26, р. 17]. Although the political elite 
has gained a better understanding of the gravity of the problem, few prac-
tical measures have been taken. This results in ‘a rapidly growing criti-
cism of the migration policy in Europe. The problem cannot be reduced 
to migration and minorities. They are not synonyms of poverty, unem-
ployment, and aggression — which, for instance, Britons view as the 
cause of riots in their cities provoked by the so-called chavs. Crises also 
affect members of the middle class, thus widening the gap between them 
and the upper class. This does not eliminate the question about strategies 
for integration, adaptation, multiculturalism, focal or dispersed ethnic set-
tlement pattern. Nor does it eliminate the question about social stratifica-
tion or the absence thereof’ [18, p. 11]. The temptation of multicultural-
ism remains a ‘headache’ for both Western European governments and 
the advocates of multicultural and tolerance [4, p. 45]. Before the begin-
ning of the emergency EU summit on migration scheduled for June 2018, 
the President of France Emmanuel Macron emphasised that migrant cri-
sis in the EU had grown into a political crisis [14]. 
‘Two sides of the same coin’ or the timeline of the Chinese immigra-
tion in Europe. Against the background of an unprecedented increase in 
immigration in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, few stud-
ies pay attention to migration from China. Works focusing on the geo-
graphical aspect are either absent or unknown to us. To a degree, this is 
explained by the history of the process, which can be perceived and eval-
uated from two perspectives — those of the country of origin and the 
country of destination. In terms of scale, direction, and structure, Chinse 
emigration is divided into two distinct eras. The first era comprises three 
periods. The first period — from antiquity to the 19th century — is char-
acterised by relatively modest Chiense migration to the neighbouring 
countries, primarily those of South-East Asia. The period spanning 
through the 19th century, the fall of the Qin dynasty, the substantial 
weakening of China, and the foundation of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na in 1949, was marked by a considerable expansion of the geography of 
migration, its main channel being the coolie trade. In the next three dec-
ades — from 1949 to 1978 — migration was almost non-existent, since 
the country’s borders were closed at the time. The second era began as 
China embarked on economic reforms in 1978. Few have paid attention 
to the fact that almost half of today’s Chinese diaspora emigrated from 
the country after this landmark event. The emergence of the so-called 
‘new’ migrants dramatically affected the existing diasporas and the per-
ception of the Chinese across the world. Such migrants have made a sig-
nificant contribution to the development of China. They became a major 
force behind the Chinese modernisation and an important link between 
the People’s Republic of China and the rest of the world [17]. 
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Despite its geographical remoteness, the European continent has at-
tracted the Chinese population for a long time. Experts distinguish three 
stages of the Chinese immigration in the region. The first stage — from 
the late 19th to the mid-20th century — was characterised by sporadic 
arrivals of the Chinese and the emergence of small diasporas in Western 
European countries, mostly those with a colonial past. Having come by 
sea, most migrants settled in the port cities. Others were arriving by land 
via Russia. The only period of a massive influx of migrants from China 
spanned the first years of the First World War, as the European countries 
were faced with workforce shortage. The native population of Great Brit-
ain and France often viewed such migrants as a ‘national threat’. After 
the end of the war, most Chinese migrants were repatriated. During this 
period, Chinese migrants founded small Chinese quarters — ethnic en-
claves, Chinatowns — in many large cities. The second stage (from the 
mid-20th century to the 1980s) witnessed an increase in the number of 
Chinese immigrants, accounted for by the undocumented emigration 
from the PRC during the Cultural Revolution and secondary migration 
influxes from Asia.2 At the time, the Chinese appeared in the countries of 
Central Europe and occupied their own economic niche — the restaurant 
business [32]. The third, current, stage, is a product of the historical coin-
cidence, when the second era of Chinese emigration met the liberalisation 
of migration laws in the European countries aimed at attracting interna-
tional human resources. The distinctive features of the period are the 
massive Chinese immigration and the emergence of the Eastern European 
states as the likely destinations. The new wave is unique in terms of the 
sex ratio, the high proportion of young people and qualified specialists, 
and the large contribution of the educational migration. Note that over 
2.6 million Chinese students obtained the higher education abroad. Only 
1.1 million (41.9 %) returned home. In 2011, 339 thousand Chinese stu-
dents were studying at international universities [21; 30]. 
According to Ernst G. Raventstein’s econometric model [34] and Ev-
erett S. Lee’s push-pull theory — if one refrains from analysing the push-
ing agents — the attractiveness of Europe for the Chinese immigration is 
sustained by several groups of historico-geographical, political, and so-
cio-economic factors. Calculating the correlation between the proportion 
of Chinese migrants in the national population and a series of statistically 
available measures for the set of EU member states (table 1) makes it 
possible to take into account and ‘weigh’ the significance of individual 
factors. It turns out that, alongside the tenets of the immigration policy, 
the most important motivators in choosing the country of destination are 
the local population’s wellbeing and incomes, the labour market perfor-
mance, and the economic cooperation between the possible destination 
and the PRC.  
                                                     
2 The UK was the preferred destination for the ethnic Chinese from Malaysia 
and Hong Kong; the Netherlands, for those from Indonesia and Surinam; and 
France, for those from Indochina. 
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Table 1 
 
The significance of factors affecting the Chinese immigration  
in European countries, 2013* 
 
Measures The proportion of the Chinese  immigrants in the national population 
HDI 0.7 
Annual net 0.67 
FDI stock from China 0.58 
Unemployment rate – 0.26 
Chinese diaspora as a proportion of the 
population 0.78 
 
* Comment: the significance of factors is determined based on a calculation 
of rank correlation coefficients. 
Compiled by the authors on the basis of [20; 23; 27; 29]. 
 
However, the decisive role is played by the ‘feedback’ — the pres-
ence of an established Chinese community (here, the correlation coeffi-
cient reaches 0.78), which once again testifies to the importance of immi-
grants’ social networks. 
In 2015, the Chinese accounted for less than 3 % of the 76 millions of 
international migrants in Europe [22; 23; 27]. Not all the first generation 
immigrants are the citizens of the PRC or the Republic of China.3 Their 
distribution is very irregular, which is explained by the differences in the 
personal priorities and in the attractiveness of individual countries. For 
example, 285,000 Chinese people live in the UK, from 80 to 160 thou-
sand in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Much fewer 
Chinese immigrants live in Italy and Hungary. Note that, recently, the 
latter has been playing the role of the ‘gate to Europe’.4 In view of the 
high mobility of population both within the EU and beyond the Schengen 
Area, to obtain an accurate estimate of the distribution of the first-
generation Chinese immigrants, it is necessary to eliminate the intrare-
gional migrations. The calculations of the proportion of the Chinese in 
the allochtonous population show that, while becoming more pro-
nounced, the overall situation does not change dramatically. However, it 
is possible to distinguish three categories of countries. The first one 
brings together states that are extremely attractive to Chinese migrants 
                                                     
3 The European countries, all the countries of the EU, consider the Republic of 
China a part of the PRC and do not establish diplomatic ties with the former. 
4 For example, from October 1988 to April 1992, 45,000 transit migrants from 
China crossed the territory of Hungary. Later, they have scattered across Europe 
and, partly, North America [33, р. 16]. 
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(the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Finland). The countries of the sec-
ond category are equally attractive to Chinese and European migrants 
(Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg). The third group comprises coun-
tries characterised by the greatest openness to the ‘outer world’. The UK 
and France are the major destinations for migrants both from Europe and 
from all the other regions (fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Chinese migrants in the EU and EFTA countries, 2011 
 
Prepared on the basis of [20; 23; 27]. 
 
The increase in the number and spatial concentration of immigrants 
launched the formation of a Chinse diaspora. Nevertheless, there is no 
established research methodology for studying this phenomenon. A clear 
definition, a set of generic characteristics, and a single classification are 
also lacking [5, p. 563, 569]. As T. S. Kondratyev stresses, despite the 
long history of the phenomenon, this diaspora drew the international re-
searchers’ attention only in the late 1970s. In Russia, they have been 
studied since the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, ‘in the past dec-
ade, such eminent Russian researchers as M. A. Astvatsaturov, V. I. Dyat-
lov, T. S. Illarionov, Z. I. Levin, A. V. Militarev, T. V. Polodkov, V. D. Pop-
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kov, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, T. I. Chaptykova, and others ha-
ve not only presented their viewpoints on a wide range of diaspora-rela-
ted issues but also started an animated discussion’ [9]. Chinese diaspora 
studies are complicated by a historically ramified conceptual framework. 
According to the law of the PRC on the Protection of the Rights and Inte-
rests of the Returned Overseas Chinese and their Relatives of September 7, 
1990 [6], there are several terms and definitions for the Chines living 
outside the country. 
Tongbao — ‘compatriots’ (Chinese 同胞) — are the Chinese living in 
the Republic of China and the special administrative regions of Hong 
Kong and Macau. Technically, they are not considered members of the 
Chinese diaspora.5 
Huaqiao — ‘Chinese migrants’ (Chinese 华) — are the Chinese hold-
ing the citizenship of the PRC or the special administrative regions of 
Hong Kong and Macau but permanently residing abroad. Historically, 
this term included the Chinese migrants rather than those living overseas 
on a permanent basis. This term is widely used in the Russian language 
literature. 
Waiji huaren — ‘foreigners of Chinese descent’ (Chinese 外籍华人) — 
are the Chinese (huaqiao and their descendants), naturalised or holding a 
foreign citizenship by birth, and thus stripped off the citizenship of the 
PRC, the Republic of China, or the special administrative regions of 
Hong Kong and Macau. This term refers to the foreigners of Chinese de-
scent. It is often abbreviated to huaren — the Chinese (Chinese 华人). 
Huayi — ‘descendants of the Chinese’ (Chinese 华裔) — are people of 
the Chinese origin, descendants of Chinese migrants. This term refers to 
people born and raised outside China, who studied and socialised abroad, 
i. e. the migrants of the second, third generations. The Huayi are part of 
huaren. 
The term Haiwai huaren — the overseas Chinese (Chinese 海外华人
huaren) — refers to all the Chinese and people of Chinese origin living 
abroad, all the Chinese migrants, the overseas Chinese community, virtu-
ally, the Chinese diaspora. All the official documents of the PRC and the 
Republic of China use this term to denote the Chinese living outside Chi-
na, regardless of their citizenship. It refers to both the citizens of the 
PRC, the Republic of China, and the special administrative regions of 
Hong Kong and Macau, residing abroad and the naturalised ethnic Chi-
nese. The diaspora includes the descendants of the Chinese migrants and 
the people born outside China in multi-ethnic families but preserving 
their ethnic identity and ties to the homeland. 
                                                     
5 After the incorporation of Hong Kong and Macau, on October 31, 2000, 
amendments were made to the respective laws. 
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The English language literature often uses a calque of the Chinese 
term to describe the diaspora (all the Chinese living outside China) — the 
overseas Chinese. 
There can be no doubt about the existence of the Chinese diaspora as — 
according to the definition given by T. V. Poloskova — a robust cohesive 
social group (an association of people sharing a distinctive characteristic 
and participating in joint efforts coordinated by formal and informal insti-
tutions) that lives outside the country of the common geographical origin, 
has a common ethnic identity, and creates social, political, and economic 
institutions to support their identity and cohesion [15]. However, the var-
ying terminology and principles of statistical recording cause the calcula-
tions of the size of the phenomenon to vary dramatically. The estimates 
of the number of the ethnic Chinese residing outside the country of origin 
range from 35 to 62 million people. In Beijing, they say with pride: ‘Eve-
rywhere where the Sun shines, there are our compatriots’ [12]. However, 
most of the Chinese community — above 70 % — lives in the ASEAN 
countries. In comparison, the diaspora in Europe looks very modest, alt-
hough its exact numbers are unknown. In 2011, the Europe — China Re-
search and Advice Network (ECRAN) estimated the number of the ethnic 
Chinese in the EU countries at 2.3 million people, which is 1.5 times the 
estimate of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) [27; 31]. 
At the same time, when compared to the other regions of the world, 
Europe stands out in that its Chinese diaspora is highly mosaic (fig. 3). 
Firstly, the size of diasporas ranges widely: from 650,000 in the UK to 
below 1,000 in some smaller countries. Secondly, the ratios between the 
huaren and huaqiao significantly differ, which translates into the predom-
inant loyalty either to the local or to the Chinese authorities. Naturally, 
the former are prevalent in most of the EU member states with few ex-
ceptions (Italy, Spain, Finland, etc.). Thirdly, there is a dramatic differen-
tial among European countries in the proportions of the first-generation 
migrants with a ‘youth excess’, of highly educated people, and of the 
qualified specialists striving to assimilate with Europeans and find pres-
tigious employment in science, medicine, business, finance, education, 
management or arts. Such migrants determine the quantitative parameters 
of the diaspora. They are responsible for the ‘model minority’ stereotype, 
entrenched in the American society.6 However, this stereotype is only 
partly accurate, since it applies only to the privileged part of the diaspora. 
There is another, ‘shadow’ part, comprising the manufacturing and ser-
                                                     
6 The term ‘model minority’ was coined by the sociologist William Peterson in 
his essay ‘Success Story: Japanese American Style’ published by the New York 
Times in 1966. It referred to Asian Americans as ethnic minorities that managed, 
despite marginalisation, to achieve success in the US. 
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vice workers. Although they vary significantly in the demographic pa-
rameters, they are brought together by a low level of education and well-
being, as well as a poor command of the local language. Many of such 
migrants are undocumented. This is a separate and, as of yet, poorly studied, 
field. However, the emergence of what is called in classical political sci-
ence ‘mutually reinforcing cleavages’ — deep divides between local citi-
zens and deprived immigrants speaking a different language and pro-
fessing a different religion — is very unlikely in this case [28; 35; 37]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Chinese diaspora in the EU, 2011 
 
Compiled by the authors on the basis of [20; 27; 31]. 
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As of today, there exists parity between the first-generation Chinese 
immigrants (53 %) and the very diverse huayi in the EU. However, in the 
two thirds of the member states, the Chinese diaspora started to develop 
only recently, which testifies to the novelty of the phenomenon and 
stresses the need for further studies. A combined analysis of the size and 
‘age’ of a diaspora makes it possible to divide the EU member states into 
four major groups. Two groups are represented by countries with a sig-
nificant proportion of the Chinese diaspora. New’ migrants account for 
less than 50 % in the first group (the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Ireland) and for over 50 % in the second one (Germany and Spain). 
The two groups characterised by small Chinese diasporas are formed by 
analogy. Most of such countries have a large proportion of the first-
generation migrants (table 2). In a number of cases, for instance, in Swe-
den and the Baltics, they account for at least 85 % of the respective dias-
poras. 
 
Table 2 
 
The EU member states grouped by the size and ‘age’  
of the Chiense diaspora, 2011 
 
Size  
category 
Size  
of the diaspora, 
thousands 
‘Age category’:* 
‘Old’ ‘Young’ 
Large 
 Large and ‘old’ Large and ‘young’ 
Above 500 UK, France,  
100—500 Italy, Netherlands Spain, Germany, 
50—100 Ireland  
Small 
 Small and ‘old’ Small and ‘young’ 
10—50 Belgium, Portugal Austria, Sweden, Greece,  Hungary Denmark 
 Below 10 Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia 
Finland, the Czech Republic,  
Poland, Luxembourg, Cyprus,  
Slovenia, Lithuania, Croatia,  
Malta, Latvia, Estonia 
 
* The ‘age’ of a diaspora is identified based on the proportion of the first-ge-
neration immigrants. 
Compiled by the authors on the basis of [27]. 
 
The gravitation of the ‘new’ migration towards a few destination 
countries contributed to a greater differential in the Chinese diaspora dis-
tribution. The size of diasporas has a distinct longitudinal gradient — it 
decreases eastward (fig. 2) — closely corresponding to the geography of 
the most economically developed and populous countries. In particular, 
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this is proven by the high correlation coefficients for the EU member 
states (0.8174 for GDP and 0.7908 for the population size). Over 98 % of 
the diaspora live in 10 countries, with the UK and France being new 
home to 50 % of Chinese migrants. Large Chinese communities emerged 
in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. Note that the latter two 
states — which are often considered migrants exporters’ — offered an 
amnesty to illegal immigrants. The Nordic countries and Eastern Europe-
an states, the borders of which opened to the Chinese immigration only in 
the 1990s, pale against this background. The only exceptions are Hunga-
ry and Romania, which are characterised by an excessive proportion of 
the Chinese in the structure of international immigration. In other words, 
from the perspective of the core-periphery concept, the distribution of the 
Chinese diaspora in Europe is polycentric, with a distinctive regional 
core and a vast north-eastern periphery. Experts are expecting the diaspo-
ra to grow rapidly in the major countries of the core — the UK, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as in Hungary, which still serves, 
to some degree, as a transit hub. 
Due to a number of circumstances, the Chinese minority is almost ab-
sent in rural areas. The Chinese obviously gravitate towards cities. One 
might say that the distribution of the Chinese diaspora closely corre-
sponds to Europe’s urban geography, with an emphasis on capital and 
port cities. The discrimination against the Chinese at the first stage of 
immigration resulted in the emergence of ethnic enclaves — China-
towns.7 The elimination of the problem, as well as the new integration 
opportunities, which arose after World War II, explain why there are no 
large American-style Chinese enclaves in the European agglomerations. 
The Chinese live dispersed across Europe. Sparsely populated, the few 
enclaves serve mostly as a scene for ethnic businesses. In the UK, the 
main centres of the Chinese diaspora settlement are London (30 % of the 
diaspora), Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester, and Liverpool. In France, 
these are Lyon and Marseille; in Italy, Milan, Florence, Turin, and Ven-
ice; in Spain, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Alicante; in Germany, 
Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, Frankfurt, and Munich; in the Netherlands, Am-
sterdam; in Ireland, Dublin. The histories, sizes, and structures of the di-
aspora are very different across these cities. This information can provide 
the key to understanding the geographical origins of the Chinese immi-
grants. The diaspora of the German agglomerations is dominated by the 
people from Shanghai and the north-eastern provinces of China. Most of 
the Chinese residing in Dublin came from Guangdong and Hong Kong. 
The Amsterdam Chinese originate, primarily, from Hong Kong and the 
former Dutch colonies — Indonesia and Suriname. 
Ethnic ‘diffusion’ or a part of the ‘European project’ in Beijing’s 
global strategy? Not only is the ‘new’ the Chinese immigration beneficial 
                                                     
7 The largest Chinatowns are found in Paris, London, and Liverpool [19].  
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for the European sociodemographic structures and labour markets but it 
contributed to the image of the ‘model minority’ and changed the struc-
ture and distribution of the ethnic diaspora in the region. Depending on 
the initial research objective, the Chinese diaspora can be studied from 
different perspectives. Firstly, one may employ the Euro- or the Sinocen-
tric approach. Secondly, such a research can be either specialised or 
comprehensive. In both cases, it is crucial to consider the most favoura-
ble conditions for immigration and emigration when the economic and 
cultural globalisation has eliminated the need to make a final decision 
about a permanent residence. Philip Q. Yang characterised this phenome-
non as the ‘transnationalism’ of Chinese migration [36]. 
Within the transition to the third global integration cycle, the problem 
of the Sinification of Europeans is assuming a partly local character amid 
the emerging struggle of major powers for the world leadership. The cur-
rent positions of the parties involved in the migration processes can be 
generalised and expressed by oriental provers. For China, the most suita-
ble saying is ‘The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The sec-
ond best time is now’. For Europe, it is ‘Live in peace. When the spring 
comes it will take no effort for the flowers to bloom’. Remarkably, China 
considers emigration to be a part of its global strategy, which can be easi-
ly combined with other effective ‘soft power’8 tools to engage European 
countries in cooperation in various fields, including trade, projects and 
investment, research and development, education,9 sociocultural initia-
tives, etc. 
In Europe, the scale of Chinese businesses is much larger than that of 
all the other Asian minorities. Over the past six years, Chinese invest-
ment in the EU has increased tenfold [7]. According to EY Consulting, it 
grew threefold in 2016 alone — from USD 30.1 billion to 85.8 billion. 
That year, the Chinese bought into 309 European companies. Here, Ger-
many ranks first (68 companies); the UK second (47); and France and 
Italy, third (34 each). For the sake of comparison, ten years ago, in 2007, 
the Chinese purchased 51 European companies [16]. Although the priori-
ties of the Chinese are quite clear, the country’s investment is very di-
verse in terms of geography. It is present in all the European states, in-
cluding those of the Baltic region. In particular, the project 16 +1 10 was 
launched as early as 2012 to promote cooperation with Central and East-
                                                     
8 The term ‘soft power’ is interpreted very differently. In China, it means ‘wise po-
wer’. Principally, it stands for the Confucian wisdom and the cultural identity, which 
serve as major guidelines for the country’s foreign policy decision-making [8]. 
9 For example, according to the Ministry of Education of China, as of the end of 
2017, European countries accounted for over 1/3rd of all the Confucius Institutes 
and Classrooms. 
10 It brings together eleven EU member states and five Balkan countries (Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech 
Republic, and Estonia). 
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ern European states. The central goal of the project is to ‘gain access to 
technology and research, the international sales channels and the major 
brands, to ensure the supply of raw materials for the needs of the Chinese 
economy. Another goal of Chinese businesses is investment in the exter-
nal infrastructure projects, as well as granting the concessional loans to 
projects carried out by Chinese contactors’ [1]. 
In other words, China is ‘here to stay’. Moreover, the official Beijing 
is shutting down repatriation projects, which were aimed at making up 
for the human capital losses, and is embarking on a ‘serve the homeland 
from abroad’ strategy. The new strategy is designed to create a Sinocen-
tric stratum that will serve as a factor of the national influence in the 
countries with a high proportion of ethnic communities. Later, such inte-
rest groups are expected to entrench themselves in the socio-political and 
economic spheres of the country of destination and, when necessary, 
promote the interests of China. Thus, the emphasis will be placed on the 
preservation and strengthening of the diaspora’s national identity as a 
factor of China’s future global political and economic superiority [3]. 
This study gives rise to a series of general and specific questions. The 
former relate to the joint interdisciplinary efforts in studying the phenom-
enon of ethnic diasporas, the modernisation of the international migrant 
registration system, and the creation of a single centre for the registration 
of people living outside the country of birth. The specific questions focus 
on Russia, particularly, on the development of effective collaborations 
with the Russian diaspora, on the launch of international projects, and on 
a comprehensive consideration of the international — primarily, the Chi-
nese — experience in implementing a ‘soft power’ policy. 
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